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Oscar Gelderblom's book addresses a very important question for the formation of the modern world: the source of inclusive trade institutions 2 . This is one of the many pieces in the jigsaw of the emergence of modern growth in Europe. Even if I am an economist and not a specialist of either the Low Countries or the pre-eighteenth century period, and I am very happy to take part on the conversation of the subject, and I hope that by writing from the point of view of Sirius (as with as many graphs and regression tables as I could put in this short contribution), I will be able to contribute. The book has many qualities. These cannot be revealed to the reader in a collection of review essays, even if most are more interesting than mine. There is only one way to fully appreciate Oscar Gelderbom's book: to read it. This is the most useful piece of advice I can give here.
Its thesis, as I understand it, is that the source of inclusive trade institutions in early modern Europe was neither centred around limiting the power of the central state as discussed in works by Douglass North, Daron Acemoglu and their co-authors, nor around private order solutions discussed by Avner Greif 3 . It was rather urban competition, conditional on three elements. First, there must have been a large number of cities vying for foreign traders.
Second, these foreign traders had to be footloose and ready to move between cities. Third, municipal governments had to enjoy political autonomy.
Gelderblom is quite convincing that the combination of these three factors induced the creation of successful trade institutions in Bruges, Antwerp and Amsterdam from 1250 to
1650. Yet, one might wonder if that alchemy was sui generis to this particular place and time.
Can these conclusions be generalized outside the Low Countries? The world would be a better place than it is if we had such high-quality monographs on every urban experience in Europe.
Instead of waiting for historians to transform themselves into the necessary cornucopia, economists are bound to try for shortcuts. The ambition of this short paper is to suggest one.
This paper is organized around three parts. The first part discusses how precisely some of the mechanisms underlying Gelderblom's explanatory framework actually worked. Most of the time, it is simply because I have enjoyed the book so much that I am asking for more. second part presents some challenges to the generalisation of the book's thesis. The last part advances a short econometric exercise to check this generalisation.
Merchants, authorities and sovereigns
Gelderblom's explores a long period of the history of three cities in a relatively short book.
He cannot present every mechanism at work in a way that would preclude all questions. Still, I was left with some regarding the behaviour of traders, town authorities and sovereigns.
I did not understand some of the economic behaviour of traders. I will give three examples. First, how could the genuine brokers coexist with the hostellers-cum-brokers in Bruges (p. 48, note 29) if they were more expensive and non-resident merchants needed the hostellers' services? Second, the book makes clear that the system based on hostellers-cumbrokers worked as long as the merchants were non-resident (p. 50). But how and why did the merchants become resident? Was it because of the fact that the scale of merchant activity changed in such a way to force them to become resident? Was it some kind of dynamic process that made the hostellers-cum-brokers system self-defeating through the increase in the scale of merchant activity? Was it an external shock? Third, the book insists on the importance of the footloose character of foreign merchants. And yet, in the central case of ). Yet, it does not enter the debate around La Porta and co-authors' thesis that the difference between common law and Roman law explains many cross-country economic dynamism differences. 4 It is not clear if the book defends the idea that the law system of these cities should be seen as a common law system or the idea that the distinction does not make any sense (as the top of page 138 seems to suggest).
Looking further into urban political economy and institutional innovation, the book might Can the hypothesis be generalised?
All the preceding points might simply be linked to my lack of understanding of the mechanisms explored in the book. There is however a more fundamental question: can the book's hypothesis on the source of trade institutions be generalized? It is not clear one can make such an important point on European history while looking at only three cities and one region.
Geographically, if the crux of the argument is the importance of inter-urban competition, maybe the ideal place to look for it is Italy? Map 1 shows Italian political fragmentation in 1494. It was still quite intense, despite a process of consolidation that started in the 1230s and saw the disappearance of numerous sovereign city-states 5 . Prima facie, the particular elements mentioned by the book seem to have been present in medieval Italy. Certainly Italy was not excluded from the European institution building process. Presenting Northern Italy as another example validating the hypothesis defended by the book would reinforce its thesis.
However, the subsequent relative decline of Italy suggests that maybe competition between city-states was too intense in late medieval Italy and led to the demise of the whole system.
Map 1: Map of Italy in 1494
Map 2: Northern Italy in 1300
Source: www.euratlas.com NB: If you can secure the rights of this map or something equivalent, it would be better than map 1.
Later in time, it seems that the dominant centre of institutional innovation, London, was not in a situation of municipal competition (the book discusses this point on page 206). One might want to extend the pertinent geographical range of municipal competition so much that London is actually seen as being in competition with all other North Sea cities. Yet, maybe the lack of urban competition inside Britain can be seen as bringing the interplay between the city and the sovereign to the forefront. That would take us back to a story à la North. Another reason to push in that direction is that one suspects that the relations between the "town elders" in London and the English parliament were much more about double capture than about autonomy, especially after the decline of the importance of guilds linked with regulated international trading in the city during the second half of the seventeenth century 6 .
Looking at medieval Italy and mercantilist Britain suggests that maybe the three cities studied are at a "sweet spot" for the type of urban competition the book describes. That was not the way merchant activity was encouraged before or after, and the hypothesis it defends is valid "only" for the Low Countries between 1250 and 1650. This "only" is obviously slightly ironic, because finding a proper way of understanding the rise of merchant institutions during this crucial period is by itself an important task.
That is the direction suggested by Larry Epstein's argument about the evolving optimal level of state sovereignty. 7 In his view, institutional transaction costs, and hence economic activity are a function of the prevalence of prisoners' dilemmas and coordination failures.
Competition between sovereign entities encouraged emulation, the development of economic activity, and the enlargement of its geographic scale. At some point, however, economic activity was so extended that sovereign competition prevented coordination on a large enough geographical scale and made the preceding political structure inefficient, leading the way to a new political structure (see Figure 1 ). In that perspective, the territorial state and the urban federation that are under examination in the book are only particular stages in European development. Maybe Avner
Greif's point of view of the crucial ingredients for institutional building was true before (or elsewhere), and North and Acemoglu's point of view was true after (or elsewhere). The seminal paper studying the dynamics of city growth using this database has been the one by Maarten Bosker, Eltjo Buringh and Jan Luiten van Zanden on the dynamics of urban development in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. 12 Taking their cue from economic geography, they use an "urban potential" variable to measure the interdependence of city growth. Is computed, for each city, as the sum of the population of all other cities inversely weighted by distance. This variable can also be understood as a measure of urban competition, and should play a central role in a test of the 'Cities of Commerce' hypothesis.
Intense urban competition is only one of three conditions 'Cities of Commerce' puts forward for the design of merchant institutions. The second one is municipal autonomy.
Measuring the actual autonomy of more than a thousand towns would be problematic. Staying as close as possible to the original paper by Acemoglu and his co-authors, we use their "starting institutions" variable. It measures the strength of institutions that constrained the power of the monarchy and allied groups. In late medieval Europe, that could be taken as a proxy of municipal autonomy, as cities were one of the main alternative rule-makers to sovereigns.
The last condition is the presence of footloose traders. This is impossible to measure in a systematic way across all of Europe for so long a time. A close proxy might be participation in long-distance trade. This is not available either. Following again Acemoglu and his coauthors, I use direct participation to Atlantic trade (defined as trade with Sub-Saharan Africa, America and Asia). This can at least be quantified at the country level throughout the period.
It is problematic as well, as current Belgium did not participate directly in Atlantic trade such defined, excluding Antwerp and Bruges from that qualification. Furthermore, Atlantic trade was not the important moving factor at the beginning of the period under study. I could not think of any other simple way to introduce this hypothesis, however. I am sure the reader will keep this caveat in mind while examining the results of the exercise.
Partly to solve these missing variables issue, we use city fixed effects in the following regression exercises. If we consider the presence of traders in the Low Countries to be a permanent characteristic, they should control for that. Their main limitation is that they do not allow us to study the interplay of the three aspect of the hypothesis. In other words we are not able to measure the combined effect of urban competition, municipal autonomy and a large number of traders. Table 1 shows the result of a panel regression with fixed effect relating city growth with various explanatory variables. Four variants are given: including only cities more than 5,000 from 1300 to 1850 ("Balanced panel"), including all cities ("Unbalanced panel"), including only urban competition and starting institutions variables (columns 1 and 3), including also Atlantic-trade related variables (columns 2 and 4). Atlantic-trade related variable includes an Atlantic-trade potential, which is a measure of urban competition restricted only to Atlantic trade cities and computed the same way as urban potential. Explaining variables are introduced in logs. This is a standard procedure that allows approximately to interpret the coefficients in terms of semi-elasticities, id est the association between changes of the explained variable in percentage points and changes in the explaining variables in percentage (not percentage points). For example, the first specification suggests that ceteris paribus, increasing city size by 10% is associated with a decreased of annual city population growth by 0.036 percentage point (-0.036 = log(1.1)*(-0.38)). To put that result in perspective, mean annual city growth is 0.21 percent in the sample. So a city with the mean growth rate would see it reduced to 0.174 if its size were to increase by 10%.
The quantitative exercise suggests the book's hypothesis cannot be easily generalised to the whole European experience. Urban competition is always associated with faster city growth -though the result has more than 10 percent probability of being due to chance in the balanced panel estimates. However, the interacted coefficient between starting institutions (which we are using as proxies of municipal autonomy) and urban potential is negative, suggesting that better urban institutions actually dampened the positive effect of urban competition. The interacted coefficient between starting institutions, Atlantic trade potential and actual country trade is also negative, suggesting -if one is ready to go on a limb, and accept that participation in Atlantic trade is a good indicator of the presence of footloose merchants -that the presence of footloose merchants reduced a bit more the combined effect of urban competition and municipal autonomy.
One should not make too much of these computations (though I doubt any of my readers are tempted to do so). The first reason is that, as we have discussed, urban competition is approximately the only thing that we are measuring with some degree of confidence. We are missing good proxies for municipal autonomy and the presence of footloose merchants. The second reason is that the book does not pertain to explain the sources of city growth, but the sources of merchant institutions: we do not have a good outcome variable to test this result.
The case of Bruges suggest that population growth is not a good measure of success. In the current state of knowledge, the book's approach, which could be characterized as deep reflection based on three case studies, is more fruitful than the tentative quantitative approach presented here. This latter approach is confused about how to measure Bruges's success and, even if Amsterdam and Antwerp success can be partly explained by common factors, it does not capture the whole story. None of this is a surprise. What is more of a surprise is that urban competition combined with starting institutional quality does not emerge as a positive factor for the growth of European cities in general. Yet, getting better data on municipal autonomy and traders' numbers would be necessary to take this test seriously. This might necessitate reducing the sample, illustrating again the tension between precision and generalisation.
The danger of course would be the absence of dialogue between researchers with different opinions on the ideal position of the dial. I have learned a lot from this book. I hope it will inspire all kind of works on its important subject. Monographs and econometric exercises of the world, unite!
